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Effect of Labor Division between Wife and Husband on the 
Risk of Divorce: Evidence from German Data
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Using German panel data from 1984 to 2007, we analyze the impact of labor division 
between husband and wife on the risk of divorce. Gary Becker’s theory of marriage predicts 
that specialization in domestic and market work, respectively, reduces the risk of separation. 
Traditionally, the breadwinner role is assigned to the husband, however, female labor force 
participation and their wages have risen substantially. Our results suggest that there are 
gender-specific differences, e.g. female breadwinner-couples have a substantially higher risk 
of divorce than male breadwinner-couples. In contrast, the equal division does not 
significantly alter the probability of separation. 
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During the last decades, we could observe a dramatic increase in divorce
rates in most developed countries. At the same time, labor force partici-
pation of married women rose substantially. The question to what extent
these two developments are related has widely been neglected by economists.
However, Becker et al. (1977) already suggest a positive relationship between
female labor force participation and risk of divorce in their work on mari-
tal stability. Their analysis is based on Becker's theory of marriage (Becker,
1973, 1974) that hypothesizes that specialization of the two spouses in house-
work on the one hand and market work on the other hand constitutes the
most important factor to gains from marriage compared to staying single.
Therefore, the one with the higher wage earnings capacity should specialize
in market work, whereas the other one should specialize in doing housework.
Due to their higher gains from marriage, these specialized couples should
consequently have a lower risk of divorce than couples where both spouses
are employed.
In principle, it should not matter whether the husband or the wife partici-
pates in the labor force as long as he or she is able to derive a higher wage
income. Nevertheless, the breadwinner role is usually assigned to the hus-
band. One reason is probably that, on average, men still earn more than
women. However, despite the high female labor force participation and that
egalitarian gender attitudes have become more common today, husbands
are also still expected to take on the provider role for his family by many
people. Consequently, couples with a husband earning less than the wife are
more likely to be frustrated or to be subject to social sanctions that in turn
leads to a higher probability of separation. Moreover, while we observe a
higher female labor force participation today than in the past, housework is
still primarily the wife's domain (see e.g. Bittman et al., 2003; Hersch and
Stratton, 1994). If one spouse is exposed to the double burden of domestic
and market work, this additional stress and the lack of spouse's support are
also very likely to reduce marital stability.
Since the Becker approach implies some strong assumptions, bargaining
models have been proposed (e.g. Manser and Brown, 1980; McElroy and
Horney, 1981). Usually, the division of household goods is not symmetric
2but depends on the two spouses' outside options and the relative bargaining
power. Both are largely a®ected by the individual's income.
Our questions of interest are whether the labor division between wife and
husband has any impact on marital stability and in what respect. Is special-
ization really stability-enhancing? If so, can we observe di®erences between
the traditional specialization "housewife, working husband" and the non-
traditional "househusband, working wife"? Does the modern equal division
imply a higher risk of separation? Previous empirical analyses by economists
and particularly sociologists are usually restricted to the impact of the wife's
income relative to the total household income. The ¯rst group of studies
¯nd a positive relationship between this ratio and the probability of divorce,
e.g. Kesselring and Bremmer (2006), Liu and Vikat (2004), or Booth et al.
(1984). That is, the higher the wife's income proportion, the higher the risk
of separation. A second group of analyses does not ¯nd any statistically
signi¯cant e®ect. Examples are Sayer and Bianchi (2000), Tzeng and Mare
(1995), and Spitze and South (1985). Concerning the behavior of German
couples only a few empirical studies exist that are usually limited to the ef-
fect of wife's employment status (e.g. BÄ ottcher, 2006, Ott, 1992). Hartmann
and Beck (1999) provide a more elaborated evaluation of the relationship
between wife's employment and marital stability. They conclude that it also
matters whether the wife earns more than the husband, and whether there
are con°icts about the division of housework or about time spent together.
Stauder (2005) instead concentrates on the e®ect of the division of market
and domestic work after childbirth. He ¯nds that marital stability is only
signi¯cantly diminished if the wife bears the double burden of market and
domestic work.
Using a rich panel data set from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP)
from 1984 to 2007, we try to shed new light on these issues. For our analysis
of divorce determinants, we use complementary log-log (cloglog) regression
models with couple-speci¯c random e®ects to control for unobserved hetero-
geneity. Our SOEP-sample consists of West German couples only that are
observed from the beginning of their marriage onwards until separation or
right-censoring. The analyses focus on the e®ects of labor division-patterns.
Nevertheless, various other factors are also controlled for like the presence of
3children of di®erent ages or education that may in°uence the risk of divorce
as well as labor division patterns.
In order to test the e®ect of specialization, we do not just consider the wife's
labor force status. We de¯ne the wife's labor income as proportion of total
household income on the one hand and her proportion of total time used for
housework on the other hand as variables of main interest. As indicator for
market work, we use income instead of hours worked because we think that,
for our purpose, the economic success is more important than time used.
Moreover, it is consistent with Becker's household model.
Our results suggest that the labor division can have an e®ect on the risk of
divorce but specialization per se is not stability-enhancing. We rather ¯nd
gender-speci¯c di®erences. Couples with a female main earner and a hus-
band doing most of the housework have a substantially higher probability of
separation than couples with the traditional male breadwinner/housewife-
pattern. Marital stability is also considerably reduced if the wife has to
bear the double burden of market and housework which we cannot ¯nd if
the husband bears it. In contrast, the equal division does not signi¯cantly
alter the risk of divorce.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the empirical ap-
proach and the data we use. In section 3, empirical results are presented.
Conclusions are given in section 4.
2 Empirical approach
We estimate the probability of divorce in period t given explanatory variables
in t ¡ 1 using a complementary log-log model with couple-speci¯c random
e®ect to control for unobserved heterogeneity.1 However, we deviate from
this de¯nition regarding our labor division variables. Labor market behavior
can be largely in°uenced by the subjective probability of divorce (see John-
son and Skinner, 1986). Therefore, we expect a change in working behavior
in the preceding years to divorce, in particular by women, if an individual
already suspects separation. This would be then a case of reversed causality
1Results do not di®er qualitatively if we use a logit or probit model.
4which would bias our estimates. For that reason, we use lagged variables of
period t ¡ 3 instead of t ¡ 1 to circumvent this problem.
The data we use is taken from the West German sample of the SOEP, waves
1984 to 2007.2 The advantage of this data is the availability of a rather
long time series of 24 periods and numerous control variables.3 We only in-
clude couples that marry during the observation period so that we are able
to follow a couple from the beginning of the marriage onwards until they
separate/get divorced (whichever is stated ¯rst) or until observations are
right-censored. In the following, we do not distinguish between separation
and divorce and use them interchangeably.
Even though it would be very interesting to extend this analysis to both
parts of Germany we restrict it to the West for two reasons. First, in the
former GDR it was a social norm for women to work even after childbirth.
Along with the ideological pressure, a low wage level, strong eligibility re-
quirements for widow's pension, and restricted possibilities to claim alimony
from the (former) husband in case of divorce forced women into full-time
employment. Public provision of cheap and extensive child care for children
of all ages made it possible to work full-time even after childbirth. In con-
trast, in West Germany, the lack of child care, incentives by the income tax
system and stigmatization of working mothers have made it advantageous
for wives to stay at home or to work at most part-time. Therefore, it is
not reasonable to pool West and East German couples since the di®erences
in female labor force participation and provision of public child care have
continued to exist even after reuni¯cation. Second, given our strategy to
look only at couples that marry during the observation period, the sample
of East German couples is too small to get reasonable estimates in separate
regressions.
Another sampling problem is the treatment of the unemployed. In our opin-
ion, a speci¯c labor division induced by unemployment of one spouse is a
2The data used in this paper was extracted using the Add-On package PanelWhiz v2.0
Nov. 2007 for Stata. PanelWhiz (http://www.PanelWhiz.eu) was written by Dr. John P.
Haisken-DeNew (john@PanelWhiz.eu). See Haisken-DeNew and Hahn (2006) for details.
The PanelWhiz generated DO ¯le to retrieve the data used here is available from us upon
request. Any data or computational errors in this paper are our own.
3For more information on the SOEP see, e.g., Wagner et al. (2007).
5special case. Losing the job is usually an unwanted, negative shock that
a®ects the ¯nancial situation of the family as well as self-esteem and self-
con¯dence of the individual concerned (see e.g. Kraft, 2001, Charles and
Stephens, 2004). In order to avoid mixing up di®erent e®ects, we drop those
observations in which at least one spouse is unemployed.4 Ultimately, the
sample consists of 1,128 couples with 8,758 couple-years and 204 divorces
and separations. Hence, the observed probability of divorce is 2.33 % per
year, and 18.09 % of the couples ¯nally separate. We do not only look at
¯rst marriages but remarriages as well: For 34.75 % of the couples, at least
one spouse does not marry for the ¯rst time.
In order to ¯nd the e®ect of spousal labor division on the risk of divorce
we de¯ne ¯ve labor division-patterns depending on the wife's proportions
of total household income and total time used for housework.5 Therefore,
we ¯rst generate the wife's monthly gross labor income (wage plus income
from self-employment) as proportion of the household's monthly gross in-
come to measure her economic success relative to the husband's.6 We think
that the ¯nancial aspect of labor force participation is in this case more
important than hours worked. Moreover, it follows Becker's household pro-
duction function that de¯nes market goods, ¯nanced by wage income, and
time use as input factors. As second element of labor division, we generate
the wife's proportion of total time used for housework. "Housework" is an
aggregate that subsumes time used for housework (in a narrower sense) and
shopping, for child care, and for crafts, repairs, and gardening. We prefer
the aggregate to the narrow de¯nition of housework since there may be an
additional gender-speci¯c specialization within housework chores which is,
however, not part of our analysis.
4Results are, nevertheless, robust to the inclusion of the unemployed.
5With this strategy we follow Stauder (2005) who uses time used for market and
domestic work, respectively, to generate ¯ve di®erent labor division patterns.
6We decide to take the gross instead of the net income because of the special regu-
lations for married couples in the German tax system. If the gross wage income of both
spouses di®er, the one with the lower income (usually the wife) pays a relatively high tax
prepayment compared to his or her spouse since all tax allowances are assigned to the
one with the higher income. This reduces the couple's overall sum of tax prepayments.
However, it makes a direct comparison of net incomes unfeasible since they su®er from
a systematic distortion by the German taxation. For an example, see e.g. Bundesminis-
terium der Finanzen (2008).
6In a next step, we de¯ne three groups of wife's income and housework pro-
portion, respectively: The wife's proportion makes up 0 to 40 %, 40 to 60 %,
or more than 60 %.7 Then, we combine them with each other and generate
¯ve labor division combinations for our regressions:
1. Traditional labor division: wife's housework proportion is larger than
her income proportion;
2. Non-traditional: wife's income proportion is larger than her housework
proportion;
3. Equal: wife's and husband's shares are virtually the same;
4. Double burden husband: wife's housework and income proportions are
both smaller than the husband's;
5. Double burden wife: wife's housework and income proportions are
both larger than the husband's;
Table 1 illustrates how the nine possible combinations of wife's income and
housework proportion are assigned to these ¯ve groups.
Table 1: Income and housework combinations
Wife's prop. Wife's prop. housework
income 0.00-0.40 0.40{0.60 0.60{1.00
0.00{0.40 double b. husb. trad.
0.40{0.60 non-trad. equal trad.
0.60{1.00 non-trad. double b. wife
Table 2 shows the distribution of these combinations in our sample. For
82.06 % of all observations the traditional labor division can be found,
whereas the non-traditional and the equal one can only be observed in 6.17
% and 5.71 % of all couple-years, respectively. As expected, there are only
7Our results do not change substantially if we use intervals 35 % to 65 % or 30 % to
70 % instead of 40 and 60 %.
7a few observations where one spouse is mainly responsible for both, earn-
ing income and doing housework. In 2.69 %, the husband bears the double
burden, whereas in 3.37 % the wife does so. The traditional pattern is the
reference group in regression (1).
Since the non-working wives constitute such a large group in our sample
we subdivide the pattern of traditional labor division. There may be a dif-
ference between wives that earn nothing and wives that earn at least some
money. Therefore, we di®erentiate between wives with zero income and a
housework proportion larger than 40 % (Trad 1), and wives with some in-
come lower than 40 % and a housework proportion at least 40 % (Trad 2).
Trad 1 is the reference group in regression (2).
Table 2: Descriptives of labor division variables
Variable No. of obs. in %
Traditional 7,187 82.06
of which:
Trad 1: wife's prop. = 0 % 3,209 36.64
Trad 2: wife's prop. < 40 % 3,978 45.42
Non-traditional 540 6.17
Equal 500 5.71
Double burden husband 236 2.69
Double burden wife 295 3.37
Total no. of observations 8,758
All variables refer to period t-3.
In addition to the above mentioned labor division variables, we include a
set of important variables that are very likely to have an e®ect on the risk
of divorce. However, we will not explain them in more detail. We consider
the household's gross income, spouses' educational level, number of children
of di®erent ages, spouses' age at marriage, the absolute age di®erence, a
8dummy variable if it is not the ¯rst marriage for at least one spouse, a
dummy for living in the city center, and marriage duration dummies.8
3 Results
Table 3 shows an extract of the coe±cients of our random e®ects-cloglog
estimations. Full estimation results are given in appendix B.
Regarding the impact of labor division on the risk of divorce we see that
two patterns do positively a®ect the risk of divorce, whereas the others only
have a relatively small and insigni¯cant e®ect. The most striking result is
that couples with a wife bearing the double burden have a substantially
higher risk of divorce than couples with a male breadwinner and a house-
wife. Similarly, if the wife is the main earner and the husband does most of
the housework, marital stability is considerably diminished. If both spouses
share equally the jobs of earning income and doing housework, the risk of
divorce is not substantially a®ected compared to the traditional labor divi-
sion. In contrast, if the husband bears the double burden, marital stability is
even enhanced, however, the e®ect is not signi¯cant. If we further subdivide
the group with a traditional labor division, we ¯nd similar results for the
¯rst four patterns. The e®ects are, however, usually stronger. If the wife
works but earns less than 40 %, marital stability is not signi¯cantly altered
compared to if she does not work.9
Thus, labor division does matter but specialization per se is not stability-
enhancing. We rather ¯nd gender-speci¯c di®erences. On the one hand,
specialization has only a stabilizing e®ect if the traditional labor division
between husband and wife is chosen. On the other hand, if the wife bears
the double burden the risk of divorce is much higher unlike if the husband
8Summary statistics are given in appendix A.
9If we assign those couples with wife's income proportion 40 to 60 % and housework
0 to 40 % or 60 to 100 % to the double burden groups, respectively, we still ¯nd the
destabilizing e®ect of non-traditional and double burden wife couples. If we separate
those of the non-traditional couples and those of the traditional couples who have an
income proportion 40 to 60 %, the coe±cients for the two non-traditional groups are still
positive and weakly signi¯cant. The lower signi¯cance can probably be attributed to the
small number of observations (366 and 174).
9does it. Given that about 2/3 of divorces in Germany are initiated by women
(see Bundesministerium fÄ ur Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend (2003)),
one could think that ¯nancial independence is a necessary precondition for
her to do so. Since the e®ect of "Trad 2" is not signi¯cant, her income must
probably exceed a certain threshold for ¯nancial independence. However,
the insigni¯cant result for the equal division contradicts this interpretation.
Frustration of one or both spouses that the wife is the main earner and
not the husband as traditionally expected seems to be a better explanation
for our ¯ndings. Moreover, the husband's self-esteem might be adversely
a®ected by her economic success.
Table 3: Coe±cients of RE-cloglog-estimations
(1) (2)
Equal division, t-3 0.1868 0.3691
(0.3004) (0.3335)
Non-trad. division, t-3 0.5525** 0.7277**
(0.2735) (0.3082)
Double b. husband, t-3 -0.4541 -0.2607
(0.5311) (0.5530)
Double b. wife, t-3 0.7594** 0.9315***
(0.3235) (0.3532)
Trad 2, t-3 0.2599
(0.2009)
Other variables yes yes
No. of obs. 8,758 8,758
No. of couples 1,128 1,128
Log-likelihood -931.823 -930.969
1) Standard errors in parentheses.
2) *: p<0.10, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01.
3) Full estimation results are given in appendix B.
4) Reference groups: Traditional lab. div./Trad 1.
104 Conclusions
Using a rich panel data set of German couples, we test the hypothesis that
specialization in market work and housework, respectively, increases marital
stability. Gary Becker assumes that gains from marriage mainly result from
the complementarity of man and woman in the production of home com-
modities. Therefore, one spouse should specialize in earning money (tradi-
tionally the husband), and the other one should specialize in doing house-
work (traditionally the wife) in order to reduce the risk of divorce. However,
it is questionable whether this aspect still (if ever) matters. Nowadays, it is
quite common for married women to work in the labor market. Moreover,
some families rely on her income, at least temporarily, since job histories of
men are increasingly characterized by breaks with spells of unemployment.
In addition, only recently, German policy-makers reformed parental leave-
regulations in such a way that fathers have an incentive to take a share of
the legal parental leave. Thus, the traditional labor division with a work-
ing husband and a housewife should be less prevalent and consequently less
relevant for marital stability.
Our data set provides rich information for both spouses about e.g. labor
force status, income, children, and time used for housework. Hence, we are
able to test for the e®ect of actual labor division on the risk of divorce.
We show that it matters who does what. While the equal division does
not signi¯cantly alter the risk of divorce, couples with a female breadwin-
ner and a househusband have a higher risk of divorce than couples with a
male main earner and a housewife. Hence, specialization per se does not
enhance marital stability, only the traditional one. Marital stability is also
substantially reduced if the wife bears the double burden which we cannot
¯nd for husbands. Our results suggest that frustration that the wife is the
main earner and not the husband (so that the wife could stay at home) as
traditionally expected substantially reduces the gains from marriage.
11A Descriptive statistics
Table 4: Descriptive statistics of additional explanatory variables (all
couple-years)
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
For at least one spouse not ¯rst marriage 0.34 0.47
H: Age at marriage 31.92 7.96
W: Age at marriage 29.24 7.19
Absolute age di®erence 3.91 3.79
Live in city center 0.08 0.28
H: High-educated 0.20 0.40
H: Medium-educated 0.72 0.45
H: Low-educated 0.08 0.27
W: High-educated 0.11 0.31
W: Medium-educated 0.76 0.43
W: Low-educated 0.13 0.34
No. of HH members age 0{1 0.12 0.34
No. of HH members age 2{7 0.64 0.78
No. of HH members age 8{15 0.45 0.76
HH's gross income in 1,000 Euro of 2000 3.87 2.42
Total no. of observations 8,758
1)"H:" stands for husbands, "W:" for wives, "HH" for household.
2) All variables refer to period t-1 except household's gross income.
B Full estimation results
Table 5 shows all coe±cients of our random e®ects-cloglog estimations. Stan-
dard errors are given in parentheses. Since we estimate a random e®ects-
model, table 5 also includes ½, the proportion of the total variance that is
contributed by the panel-level variance. It ranges from 0.45 to 0.47. The
hypothesis that ½ = 0, which would imply that the random e®ects estimator
is not signi¯cantly di®erent from the pooled estimator, can be rejected on a
5 % signi¯cance level.
12Table 5: Coe±cients of RE-cloglog-estimations
(1) (2)
Equal division, t-3 0.1868 (0.3004) 0.3691 (0.3335)
Non-trad. division, t-3 0.5525** (0.2735) 0.7277** (0.3082)
Double b. husband, t-3 -0.4541 (0.5311) -0.2607 (0.5530)
Double b. wife, t-3 0.7594** (0.3235) 0.9315*** (0.3532)
Trad 2, t-3 0.2599 (0.2009)
Not ¯rst marriage -0.0141 (0.2111) -0.0341 (0.2150)
H: age at marriage -0.0075 (0.0208) -0.0069 (0.0212)
W: age at marriage -0.0132 (0.0207) -0.0112 (0.0212)
Absolute age di®erence 0.0499* (0.0256) 0.0502* (0.0261)
Live in City 0.7948*** (0.2302) 0.8084*** (0.2333)
H: high educ -0.7021** (0.3540) -0.7113** (0.3588)
H: med educ -0.4656* (0.2665) -0.4826* (0.2702)
W: high educ -0.2981 (0.3895) -0.3265 (0.3963)
W: med educ -0.2569 (0.2353) -0.2697 (0.2388)
No. of HH members age 0-1 -0.8766*** (0.3074) -0.8652*** (0.3083)
No. of HH members age 2-7 -0.0762 (0.1200) -0.0216 (0.1271)
No. of HH members age 8-15 0.2405* (0.1266) 0.2558** (0.1283)
HH gross income, t-3 0.0447 (0.0334) 0.0386 (0.0349)
Constant -2.8445*** (0.6695) -3.1310*** (0.7195)
No. of obs. 8,758 8,758
No. of couples 1,128 1,128
½ 0.44872 0.47020
p-value H0 : ½ = 0 0.028 0.020
Log-likelihood -931.823 -930.969
1) Standard errors in parentheses.
2) *: p<0.10, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01.
3) "H": husband, "W": wife, "HH": household.
4) Results of marriage duration dummies not presented.
5) Reference groups: Low educated; Traditional/Trad 1.
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